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The Political Economy of Long-Term  
Fiscal Planning from 
a Social Democratic 
Perspective 
Michael Cullen 
Long-term fiscal projections
Great care and intellectual power have gone into the process 
of producing the Treasury’s 2013 long-term fiscal projections.1 
Those projections will, no doubt, create some controversy. 
The assumptions will be open to challenge, as will, even more 
so, some of the policy conclusions that the Treasury may 
draw from the exercise. Yet no one should be in doubt that 
this process has been a much more open and considered one 
than its predecessors. I enjoyed participating in the Treasury’s 
Long-Term Fiscal External Panel and have been impressed by 
the calibre of the officials involved.2 
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cycle. The self-interest of individuals 
and groups frequently creates barriers to 
sustaining a longer-term focus. 
In the modern world of general 
political debate a healthy scepticism has 
been replaced all too often by a pervasive 
low-grade cynicism which attributes 
base motives to nearly all activities 
(except those of political commentators, 
bloggers and the like, of course). In such 
a world any of the conclusions arising 
out of such an exercise as this are too 
easily sensationalised and/or dismissed 
as we return to discussing whatever the 
immediate itch of the day is. And if 
the possible conclusions of the exercise 
look too worrying, then people may 
simply turn away and avoid them since 
it is all well into the future anyway. Most 
importantly, most people have enough 
to worry about already and just want to 
get on with their lives. We always have to 
remind ourselves that ‘policy wonks’ are 
not the normal run of humanity, any more 
than monks were in the Middle Ages. 
Given those realities, it is not surprising 
that the attitude of many politicians can 
be summed in that famously apocryphal 
saying: ‘What has posterity done for me?’ 
Or, as the prime minister of Luxembourg 
recently put it, ‘We all know what to do, 
we just don’t know how to get re-elected 
after we’ve done it.’ 
To engage in producing long-term fiscal 
projections which push out the forecasts 
of revenue and expenditure 50 or even 
100 years might seem an exercise in 
either hubris or self-delusion, given the 
inevitable frailty of whatever assumptions 
are made. That is especially so when we 
remember that fiscal forecasts are often 
well in error even after as short a period as 
one year, let alone 50. Moreover, both the 
technical assumptions and any assumed 
policy responses to developing issues are, 
of course, deeply intermeshed with the 
realities of politics, as well as the changing 
nature of the surrounding society and 
economy. Most political discourse occurs 
within a relatively short time frame, which 
is not simply a function of the electoral 
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Despite all of these issues, this is 
no reason to give up. The exercise of 
producing long-term fiscal projections 
is an important one which may yet 
contribute to intelligent debate about 
some of the long-term challenges we face 
as a nation and how best to meet them. 
The projections are not a prediction 
of what will actually happen. They are 
projections of what would happen if 
certain reasonable assumptions based 
largely on current policies, economic 
assumptions around growth, inflation 
and so on and demographic trends are 
allowed to flow through into the fiscal 
numbers. We may question some of those 
assumptions, but it would be a foolish 
person who would argue that any of them 
are unreasonable. The results therefore 
need to be taken seriously.
Fiscal adjustment from a social democrat 
perspective
The main, and entirely expected, 
conclusion of the long-term fiscal 
projections is that on the current path 
New Zealand will eventually experience 
an unsustainable increase in the level of 
government debt which will, presumably, 
require drastic corrective action, either 
voluntarily or imposed from without. 
From the perspective of a social democrat 
this matters deeply. At one level it matters 
because such crises usually mark a 
significant loss of economic sovereignty, 
as we are seeing in parts of Europe at the 
present time.
For me, this is less important than 
for some social democrats since absolute 
economic sovereignty in the modern 
world is perhaps no more than an illusion. 
What is more important is what happens 
in such rapid adjustments to a fiscal 
crisis. The distributional consequences 
are nearly always severe and can often be 
long-lasting. It would be hard to find a 
major fiscal adjustment to a crisis in the 
last generation or so in which those at 
the bottom of the heap, and those in the 
middle, did not come out a lot worse off 
than those at the top. Revolutions can be 
different – but these are not envisaged in 
the Treasury’s long-term projections. 
In the nature of things such drastic 
adjustments are seldom well thought 
through, and are driven by a ‘crash 
through or crash’ mentality which pays 
little regard to the human consequences, 
or even to evidence-based policies 
as opposed to ideologically-driven 
ones. There are people who glory in 
the possibilities of such crises, casting 
themselves in the role of a kind of fiscal 
Abraham Lincoln remarking that the 
occasion is piled high with difficulty. 
They need reminding that that was in the 
context of a brutal civil war. 
The conclusion I would draw from 
this is two-fold. The first part is that we 
should not leave to our children and 
grandchildren harder choices than we are 
prepared to make ourselves. The second 
part is that gradual adjustment over time 
is preferable to big bang pyrotechnics, 
however much that may appeal to the 
odd ‘pyrotechnician’. It is far more 
likely that most people, particularly the 
more vulnerable, will be able to cope 
under a scenario of gradual adjustment, 
especially if transitional assistance is 
provided where desirable. Moreover, 
the Treasury’s projections also say that 
gradual adjustments over time should be 
sufficient to avoid any kind of doomsday 
scenario.
At a deeper level this all matters 
because for social democrats the twin 
concepts of security and opportunity lie at 
the base of political thought and action. 
It does not take much consideration 
to see that a policy of allowing a crisis 
to develop over a long period of time 
which then forces drastic corrections is 
antipathetic to such values. Security is 
obviously threatened, but so too for many 
is opportunity. Even in New Zealand we 
can still see in such places as Murupara 
and Minginui the results, 25 years on, of 
rapid change unaccompanied by well-
managed transitions.
Thus, there is an inherent conflict 
likely between the longer-term focus, 
which is likely to be welfare-maximising 
from a social democratic perspective, 
and what might be called the mañana 
principle which tends to dominate much 
political discourse: never do today what 
you can put off until tomorrow. This is 
even more so in the very areas that are 
central to the long-term fiscal challenges: 
health and retirement income. 
Health, education, income transfers and the 
justice sector
Health
This brings me to a few comments on 
the Treasury’s projections themselves 
and some of the assumptions underlying 
them. In the case of health, the historic 
trends in the growth of expenditure are 
clear. What is also clear is that attempts 
to deviate sharply from those trends have 
fairly quickly come unstuck. In the early 
1990s, for example, strong constraint on 
spending growth led in the first instance 
to the growth of deficit spending, or what 
came to be called the ‘second chequebook’. 
This was followed by a significant 
expansion of the budget allocation which 
put public health expenditure back on 
the trend line. The same process occurred 
with greater rapidity in the early 2000s. 
The combination of demographic 
transition, new drugs and procedures, 
rising expectations, and international 
competition for staff all point to 
inexorable upward cost pressures in the 
health sector. Stronger economic growth 
may help with the costs of staff pressures, 
but will at least in part be offset by the 
relationship between health spending and 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. 
And for those tempted in that direction, 
there is little evidence that shifting 
spending to the individual actually saves 
much for the government, while it all but 
ensures greater inequality of outcomes. 
In the absence of remarkable changes 
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in health technology, which cannot be 
discounted, it seems probable that the 
fiscal risks are still on the upside from 
current projections.
Because this is an area with so much 
uncertainty it is also one in which it is 
nigh on impossible to think in terms 
of specific long-term pre-funding or 
insurance approaches. Given that there 
is always unmet need, or at least unmet 
demand, any surpluses built up in 
advance would come under intolerable 
pressure to be spent. My rather dismal 
conclusion is that the best we can aspire 
to is to try to restore a greater emphasis 
on public and preventative health, in 
particular spending on the young and 
the most disadvantaged. That is already 
increasingly difficult because of the 
ageing of the population. What is often 
forgotten, somewhat surprisingly, is 
that the demographic transition is also 
an electoral transition. Given the quite 
strong correlation between age and the 
propensity to vote, it is possible that the 
proportion of those actually voting who 
will be aged 65+ will be as high as 40% 
by 2060. If we divide the electorate into 
three blocks – 18–39, 40–64 and 65+ – the 
last will be possibly be the largest group 
of those voting and certainly the most 
focused on a narrow range of common 
interests.
To put it another way, a political party 
focused on the interests of the elderly will 
only need to capture about a fifth of the 
votes of that group to be in a powerful 
position as a power broker under a 
proportional electoral system such as 
mixed member proportional (MMP). 
It will thereby be able to protect the 
interests of the elderly, if need be at the 
expense of other groups. 
Education
This might suggest that the Treasury’s 
optimism that a demographic dividend 
will be able to be garnered from the 
spending on education due to the 
decreasing proportion of young people 
in the population is well founded. Indeed, 
the Treasury has suggested that the 
proportion of GDP spent on education 
could be reduced by increasing class 
sizes and shifting more of the cost of 
tertiary education to the individual. This 
reaffirmation of economics as the dismal 
science is to be expected, if disappointing. 
In my view, the projected ‘demographic 
dividend’ in education ignores some 
powerful countervailing factors. The 
next half century will see increasing 
competition to improve both the quality 
and quantity of education. That will 
mean further time spent in education and 
further increases in participation rates at 
the most expensive end of the system. If 
we are to seek greater efficiencies, a more 
positive approach to education would be 
in taking a more active role in ensuring 
that the skills we produce better match 
the opportunities available while avoiding 
the trap of an overly narrow vocational 
approach to education. 
Income transfers and justice 
Before turning to the two areas where I 
see the greatest opportunities for gradual 
long-term fiscal correction, let me touch 
very briefly on income transfers and justice. 
The former will continue to be significant 
for the simple reason that we cannot foresee 
an economic transformation which will 
change the tendency of a market economy 
under conditions of rapid technological 
development to create widening income 
gaps. Those developed countries with 
greater equality of outcomes maintain 
much higher revenue and expenditure 
levels than seem to be acceptable in New 
Zealand. 
As for justice, we may reap a 
demographic dividend but only if two 
things happen. One is a move away from 
the last generation’s desire to see an ever 
more punitive system. The second is a 
very large upfront investment in remedial 
measures, which, despite some rhetoric, 
there is no sign of being implemented. 
Rather, the rhetoric seems to be more 
about producing scary numbers about the 
long-term costs of current beneficiaries 
as a prelude to measures which are 
predominantly negative in relation to 
beneficiaries. The simple and enduring 
truth is that the most effective way of 
cutting the costs of benefits is to reduce 
unemployment, but not at the cost of a 
race to the bottom in terms of wages and 
conditions. 
The greatest opportunities for long-term 
fiscal adjustment: raising revenue and 
retirement income provision
That leaves two big areas: retirement 
income provision and revenue. For some 
the latter remains an ideological no-go 
zone, a slough of despond in which whole 
economies disappear, or at least, like some 
kind of science fiction stargate, enter 
from the First World and emerge into the 
Third. Perhaps it is time in New Zealand 
to abandon this kind of Tea Party silliness, 
which belongs in the realms of creationism 
and global warming rejection. 
Raising revenue
The Treasury analysis tells us two things. 
The first is that while the Treasury still 
argues that there are strong reasons for 
believing that a higher level of revenue has 
a negative impact on economic growth, it 
has to accept that the empirical evidence 
for this is weak. The second reinforces 
the first. The Treasury data is quite clear 
that the level of increase in revenue as a 
proportion of GDP needed over the next 
50 years to keep within a reasonable debt 
constraint, however defined, is well within 
the levels reached within the last ten years. 
Those levels are well below those of many 
other developed countries with higher 
GDP per capita than New Zealand.
The Treasury data is quite clear that the level of 
increase in revenue as a proportion of GDP needed 
over the next 50 years to keep within a reasonable 
debt constraint, however defined, is well within the 
levels reached within the last ten years. 
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Such an increase can be achieved 
in a number of ways. The easiest is by 
allowing for some element of ‘fiscal 
drag’, which is removed from the long-
term fiscal projections. Simply assuming 
personal income tax brackets are adjusted 
upwards in line with the consumers price 
index (CPI) rather than GDP achieves 
substantially higher revenue to GDP over 
time, and indeed allows room for further 
ad hoc adjustments in tax brackets.
The second is by way of broadening out 
the tax base. We like to describe our system 
as broad-based, but in a number of ways 
the base has been narrowed over the last 20 
years or so. Obviously, capital gains tax is one 
option. The Treasury favours a land tax for 
efficiency reasons, but I have grave doubts 
about its practicality given the resentment 
that local body rates already cause. There 
is also the very considerable problem that 
it shares with a tax on unrealised capital 
gains that the amount due may bear a small 
relation to the ability to pay. 
Greater use of ‘hypothecated taxes’, 
such as taxes tagged to particular spending 
areas, like health expenditure, could 
also be considered, since these may be 
regarded differently by people than other 
forms of taxation given a direct relation 
to benefits they can expect to enjoy. It 
would be interesting to look further at 
the considerable overseas experience with 
hypothecated taxes in that regard. 
The essential point is that there is 
ample scope to close at least part of the 
longer-term gap between revenue and 
expenditure on the revenue side. It is 
tempting to suggest it all could be, quite 
easily, based on the Treasury projections. 
However, given my view that the risks on 
the expenditure side are heavily on the 
upside, I think that would be unwise. 
Retirement income provision
This brings me to the one large remaining 
area: the funding of retirement income 
provision. Clearly, there is any number 
of ways of specifying the objectives of 
retirement income policy. I think nearly 
all social democrats would begin with the 
desire to ensure security; that is, to take 
away the fear of poverty in old age. Along 
with that, economic considerations would 
suggest that the nature of state support 
should, at the very least, not discourage 
savings or continued participation in 
the labour market. This is essentially the 
opportunity element. The third element 
would be fiscal sustainability; the fourth 
broad societal acceptance of the fairness 
and durability of the arrangements; and 
the fifth as much simplicity as possible. 
Obviously there may be trade-offs 
between these elements. New Zealand 
Superannuation (NZS)3 scores well on 
poverty avoidance and simplicity and 
reasonably on savings and labour market 
participation. Any changes should 
preserve these as much as possible. 
But it scores much less well on fiscal 
sustainability and societal acceptance of 
durability. 
Various proposals have been made to 
address this situation, particularly raising 
the age of eligibility for NZS; lowering the 
level of payment over time, in particular 
by changing the indexation measure 
from wages to prices; or reintroducing 
some form of income testing. Of these, 
only raising the age of eligibility for NZS 
meets the criteria I have outlined. With 
life expectancy continuing to rise, some 
increase in the age of eligibility at some 
point seems inevitable. An initial phased 
increase in the age of eligibility for NZS 
with ample notice followed by periodic 
reviews seems the most sensible way to 
make this policy change and the most 
likely to win broad acceptance. 
The other two suggestions, of lowering 
the level of the NZS payment or income 
testing the payment, have little merit. Any 
significant reduction in the relationship 
of NZS to other incomes will throw many 
elderly people below the poverty line. Its 
political half-life would be something 
under three years. In any case, the current 
relativity is not some tail on the donkey 
affair but well rooted in past experience 
and studies. 
As for income testing, it did not 
survive the first MMP election and 
would not survive a future one. It clearly 
discourages work participation and 
savings, even more because an income 
test without an assets test, especially for 
the elderly, would not be very effective in 
reducing the cost of NZS.
Option 1: Enhanced KiwiSaver scheme 
The most fruitful avenue to explore, other 
than raising the age of eligibility for NZS, 
is to reduce the cost of NZS without 
reducing the standard of living of the 
elderly. This change could be brought 
about through the interaction of an 
enhanced KiwiSaver scheme and NZS.4 
It is worth beginning with the fact that 
the Australian superannuation scheme is 
both compulsory and 9% of income, soon 
to rise to 12%, paid for by a payroll tax 
on employers. However, the Australian 
scheme is coming under criticism for the 
fact that while their pension is income- 
and asset-tested, their compulsory 
superannuation can be withdrawn as 
a lump sum and all spent. Now that the 
scheme is maturing, the dynamic instability 
this creates is becoming obvious. 
New Zealand’s current arrangements 
present the same issue in a different 
way: KiwiSaver may make many more 
independent of NZS but has no impact 
on the cost of NZS. With the number 
of KiwiSavers already far higher than 
forecast, it is not a long step to make 
the scheme compulsory, tighten some 
of the criteria, and, over time, gear it up 
It is worth [noting] that the Australian 
superannuation scheme is both compulsory 
and 9% of income, soon to rise to 12%, paid for 
by a payroll tax on employers ... [h]owever, the 
Australian scheme ... can be withdrawn as a lump 
sum and all spent.
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to a level far closer to that planned in 
Australia. At that point the relationship 
between KiwiSaver and NZS becomes 
one for serious discussion. As an example 
of what could be considered I have had a 
number of options modelled. 
The models all start from KiwiSaver 
becoming compulsory from 1 July 2016, 
with all people signed up as they turn 
18 and the opt-out provision on auto-
enrolment removed. All remaining adults 
would be enrolled on 1 July 2020. The 
contribution rates would be lifted back 
to 4% of income for employees, matched 
by 4% from employers, also from 1 July 
2016. Employer contributions would then 
increase by half a per cent per annum 
until reaching either 8% in one set of 
models or 6% in the other. As a matter of 
practicality and individual affordability it 
may be desirable to begin new entrants 
on a lower personal contribution rate, say 
2%, and gear up over time, but as this has 
no significant impact on costs or effects 
over the long term it has been ignored in 
the modelling. 
All of the modelling assumes that, 
however it is made up, retired people will 
continue to enjoy a guaranteed retirement 
income at least equivalent to that of 
NZS based on the current wage relativity 
formula. Two basic ways of reducing the 
fiscal cost over the long term of meeting this 
criterion have been explored. In the first, it 
was assumed that half of the accumulated 
KiwiSaver savings would have to be accessed 
by way of annuity. Where this was less than 
the guaranteed retirement income it would 
be made up to that level. In effect this means 
that for many people the shift from state 
funding to private funding would result 
in half of their KiwiSaver savings being 
income-tested away. 
This could prove difficult to establish 
and maintain as an acceptable policy 
position, even though it would certainly 
have a substantial impact on the long-
term fiscal costs of NZS. It also has the 
usual problems of applying an income 
test fairly. However, the fiscal outcomes 
are impressive. Under either higher 
contribution rate modelling the cost of 
NZS falls to under 2% of GDP by 2050, all 
but vanishing by the end of the century. 
Remember, that is based on only 50% of 
KiwiSaver accumulations being taken by 
way of annuity.
Option 2: Tax on KiwiSaver withdrawals
An alternative which has significant 
advantages in terms of simplicity and 
fairness is to deal with the KiwiSaver/
NZS interface on the revenue side rather 
than the expenditure side. Under this 
proposal, the current NZS scheme would 
be maintained as is, with the exception 
of an initial adjustment to the age of 
eligibility to 67 being phased in starting in, 
say, 2020. The revenue offset would come 
from a withdrawal tax being imposed on 
accumulated KiwiSaver savings of either 
10% or 15%. Currently, KiwiSaver is taxed-
taxed-exempt, or ‘TTE’, which means 
that contributions come out of people’s 
post-tax income, then the income those 
contributions earn while they are in the 
fund is taxed, but withdrawals are tax-
exempt. The new KiwiSaver withdrawal 
tax would apply to those permanently 
emigrating or to the accumulated savings 
at maturity (assumed to remain at age 65). 
The tax would only apply to accumulations 
starting with the introduction of the 
compulsory scheme. 
Such a scheme would be 
administratively much simpler than the 
first option and avoids the difficulties 
of income testing, but by the end of this 
century would reduce the projected net 
cost of NZS by about 5% or so of GDP, 
having kept that net cost at about 5% of 
GDP over the second half of the century. 
Could such a scheme be politically feasible? 
Figure 1: Enchanced KiwiSaver scheme 
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Figure 2: Tax on KiwiSaver withdrawals
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The answer to that is that anything in this 
area is fraught with difficulty for obvious 
reasons. But it does seem to me to have 
at least as much chance of success as 
any of the other options that have been 
discussed publicly. 
In order to establish a clear relationship 
with maintaining the affordability of 
NZS two simple changes could be made. 
One would be to name the tax ‘NZS Tax’. 
The other would be to pay the proceeds 
of the tax directly into the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund.5
Another change which would help 
secure confidence in the future of NZS 
would be to transfer the remaining 
state asset shares into a holding 
company owned by the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund. This would, in 
effect, bring forward the resumption of 
government contributions, at a lower rate 
than previously, but also bring a welcome 
focus on long-term wealth creation with 
respect to the assets.
In the much longer term, some further 
increase in the age of eligibility for NZS 
beyond 67 will probably be required, 
but there is no reason to have to address 
that now or for some considerable time 
to come. I mentioned earlier that we 
should not leave to our children and 
grandchildren harder decisions than 
we are prepared to make ourselves. 
The reverse of that is that we do need 
to recognise their right to make some 
decisions and not try to predetermine 
posterity, even though, as we say, we can 
do more for posterity than it can do for 
us. 
For me, the crucial point remains, 
as it has been for a long time, not just 
making NZS sustainable but convincing 
people that it is. For that, decisions do 
have to be taken before too long, despite 
the reluctance of decision-makers to 
make them.
1 The Treasury’s 2013 long-term fiscal projections are 
available on the Treasury website: http://www.treasury.govt.
nz/government/longterm/fiscalposition/2013.
2 For more information about the Treasury’s Long-Term Fiscal 
External Panel see: http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/about/
chair-in-public-finance/events/long-term-fiscal-external-panel.
3 New Zealand Superannuation is a fortnightly payment 
from the government for people aged 65 years and over. 
For further information about the policy see: http://www.
workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/a-z-benefits/nz-
superannuation.html.
4 KiwiSaver is a voluntary work-based savings initiative. 
For further information about the policy see: http://www.
kiwisaver.govt.nz/.
5 The New Zealand Superannuation Fund is a government fund 
that was established to partly pre-fund the future costs of 
NZS.
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